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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j), this case was originally filed in the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. On April 16, 2001, this case was assigned by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial court's award of summary judgment to the City was correct. 
Standard of Review: This case was decided in the District Court on the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and involves the application of undisputed facts to applicable 
state and local law. Therefore, the standard of review is correctness. Nelson v. Salt Lake 
City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether the trial court's award of summary judgment to the City can be 
justified on other proper grounds. 
Standard of Review: This case was decided in the District Court on the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and involves the application of undisputed facts to applicable 
state and local law. Therefore, the standard of review is correctness. Nelson v. Salt Lake 
City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
This case is governed, in part, by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and Woods Cross City 
Municipal Code §§ 12-14-104 and 12-22-104. These provisions are set forth in full in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case was instituted by Woods Cross City as a complaint for injunctive relief 
against Douglas R. Smith dba Ralph Smith Trucking Company ("Smith"). Smith is the 
owner of property located within Woods Cross City and an adjoining parcel in West 
Bountiful City. Smith owns and operates a trucking company on the property. Woods Cross 
City instituted an action in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen presiding, alleging that Smith's use of a portion 
of his property in Woods Cross City was in violation of the City's Zoning Ordinance. The 
City brought a Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted by the District Court. This 
appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Smith is the owner of property located within Woods Cross City, which 
property is commonly known as Lot 5 and Lots 7 through 14 of the Newport Subdivision (the 
"Property"). R. at 139. 
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2. Smith is also the owner of property within West Bountiful City and an adj acent 
parcel in Woods Cross City, which properties lie outside the Newport Subdivision (the "West 
Bountiful Property"). Smith operates Ralph Smith Trucking on the West Bountiful Property 
and has valid nonconforming use rights for the business on the West Bountiful Property. The 
West Bountiful Property is not at issue in this matter. R. at 151 (Transcript) pp. 2-3. 
3. The Property is zoned 1-1, Light Industrial. R. at 139. 
4. At times relevant to this matter, Smith was using Lot 5 and Lots 7 through 13 
of the Property to park large trucks and other equipment used in his trucking business. R. 
at 139. 
5. At times relevant to this matter, Lot 14 of the Property was being used for the 
parking of personal vehicles and other recreational vehicles such as jet skis, trailers and 
campers. R. at 139. 
6. Smith's use of Lot 5 and Lots 7 through 14 of the Property is neither a 
permitted use nor a conditional use within the 1-1 Zone. R. at 139. 
7. Smith has never applied for nor received conditional use approval or site plan 
approval for the operation of a trucking company on the Property. R. at 139. 
8. Woods Cross City has requested that Smith cease his unauthorized use of the 
Property. R. at 139. 
9. Smith has failed to comply with the request of the City. R. at 139. 
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10. In August of 1999, the City brought an action in the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, 
requesting an injunction, enjoining Smith from his use of the Property in violation of Woods 
Cross City's Zoning Ordinance. R. at 1-5. 
11. On September 21, 2000, on Woods Cross City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of the City. An Order granting the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was signed on October 16, 2000, by the District Court, and entered 
on October 19, 2000. This appeal followed. R. at 138. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's award of summary judgment in this case was correct. Smith's 
arguments relating to spot zoning, discriminatory effect of City zoning regulations, unlawful 
taking without just compensation and accessory uses were not properly pleaded and were 
never properly raised for consideration before the District Court. Smith failed to plead those 
claims as part of any answer or counterclaim. Therefore, the District Court was correct in 
awarding summary judgment to Woods Cross City. 
Even if this Court were to consider Smith's claims relating to spot zoning, 
discriminatory effect of the City's zoning regulations, unlawful taking without just 
compensation and accessory uses, Smith's arguments fail on the merits. 
Smith has argued that the City's zoning creates a spot zone. However, zoning on 
other properties around Smith's Property is consistent. Additionally, on those parcels where 
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uses are not consistent with the zoning on Smith's parcel, those uses are legally 
nonconforming or validly approved. Therefore, they cannot form the basis for a claim of 
spot zoning. 
Smith also argues that the City's zoning has created a discriminatory effect on his 
Property. However, as noted above, all other uses of property in the area of Smith's Property 
are either valid nonconforming uses or have received proper zoning approvals through the 
City. Additionally, Smith cannot now challenge the legality or wisdom of the City's zoning 
classification of the Property. 
Smith argues that the City's zoning constitutes an unlawful taking of his Property 
without just compensation. However, Smith has completely failed to present any evidence 
justifying this claim. Additionally, Smith's legal arguments fall short of the standard 
required to demonstrate the taking of property without just compensation. 
Finally, Smith argues that his use should be approved as an accessory use. However, 
Smith has failed to obtain any land-use approvals from the City to validate the primary use 
of his Property. Therefore, approval as an accessory use is not possible. To the extent Smith 
argues his use should be approved as an accessory use to the nonconforming use on the West 
Bountiful Property, his argument also fails. Such a determination would constitute an 
unlawful expansion of Smith's nonconforming use in violation of City ordinances. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court was correct and should 
be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER SMITH'S 
ARGUMENTS RELATING TO SPOT ZONING, DISCRIMINATION, 
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST 
COMPENSATION AND ACCESSORY USES WAS CORRECT. 
In the Order granting Woods Cross City's Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
matter, the Court specifically determined that "Defendant's claims of spot zoning, 
discrimination and an unlawful taking of property without just compensation have not been 
properly raised through pleadings or affidavits and therefore may not be considered by the 
court." R. at 140. Additionally, Smith's argument that his use should be approved as an 
accessory use was raised for the first time at oral argument on the summary judgment 
Motion. Therefore, the District Court's decision was correct and is well supported by law. 
Defenses not raised by the answer or by proper motion may not be raised in an 
affidavit or pleading in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). 
In Valley Bank & Trust, the plaintiff brought an action to recover on promissory notes 
signed by the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. In opposition 
to that motion, the defendant raised the issue of failure of consideration, which did not appear 
by way of affirmative defense in the answer. Additionally, defendant failed to make any 
motion to amend her answer to include that defense. In reviewing the issues, the court stated: 
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The appellant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment because her husband's affidavit had raised the defense of 
failure of consideration. The difficulty with her argument is that she was 
obligated to raise that defense in her answer to the complaint. She made only 
a general denial in her answer and did not raise any affirmative defenses. 
Failure of consideration is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded as such. 
Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P. She made no effort to move to amend her answer under 
Rule 15 to raise that defense. She could not raise it by means of an affidavit 
in opposition to summary judgment. It is not the office of an affidavit in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment to provide a means of 
introducing defenses which have not been raised by the answer or by proper 
motion. 
Valley Bank & Trust, 668 P.2d 493 at 493, 494. 
In this case, the defenses of spot zoning, discrimination, unlawful taking of property 
without just compensation and accessory uses were not raised by Smith's Answer. 
Additionally, Smith failed to take any proper action to have a motion to amend his Answer 
considered by the District Court. 
In his Brief, Smith argues that his right to present the defenses at issue was somehow 
preserved through his Rule 56(f) Motion. In that Motion, Smith sought a continuance "to 
conduct discovery and obtain affidavit and/or deposition testimony to oppose these 
Defendant's [sic] Motion." R. at 52. Neither Smith's Motion nor initial Memorandum in 
support of the Rule 56(f) Motion sought leave of court to amend his Answer. It was only in 
Smith's Reply Memorandum that it states: 
Should this Court conclude that Defendant may not seek discovery on or 
present the affirmative defenses indicated in Defendant's 56(f) Motion and 
discovery requests, Defendant hereby moves this Court for an order allowing 
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them to amend their Answer pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
R. at 65. 
Woods Cross City submits that a motion to amend an answer cannot be properly 
raised through a reply memorandum. However, even if this Court were to determine that the 
motion to amend the Answer were properly raised, that motion is stated in the alternative, 
relief only being requested if the court were to deny Smith's Rule 56(f) Motion. In fact, the 
court granted that Motion. See R. at 80. Additionally, Smith was permitted to conduct all 
the discovery he wished prior to his response to Woods Cross City's summary judgment 
Motion. If an amendment to the Answer was required by facts determined through that 
discovery, it was incumbent upon Smith to make a proper motion for leave of court to amend 
his Answer. Absent a proper motion, the law as set forth by this Court in Valley Bank & 
Trust is applicable and Smith is foreclosed from presenting the defenses at issue by his 
failure to properly raise those defenses. 
Smith also argues that this Court should apply a different standard to determine 
whether or not the affirmative defenses at issue were properly raised. Smith argues that this 
Court should apply the rationale of Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 996 P.2d 884 (Utah 
1998). However, that case is distinguishable. 
In Badger, two parties appealed from a district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of a private canal company and the state engineer. The issue arose through the 
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application of a private canal company, Brooklyn, to change a point of diversion for its water 
rights. The district court determined that the plaintiffs did not make known the nature of 
their competing private well rights in a protest hearing before the state engineer and therefore 
waived the right to claim any impairment to private well rights. The issue in Badger had 
nothing to do with whether or not the plaintiffs claims were properly pleaded, but, rather, 
dealt with whether or not the plaintiffs claims were preserved in the trial setting for appellate 
review. The standard to be applied to that question is obviously completely different than 
the standard to be applied in the question set forth in Valley Bank & Trust Co., and in this 
case. 
If this Court were to apply the analysis of Badger to the fact situation in this case, it 
would completely undo the rationale of the court in Valley Bank & Trust Co., wherein the 
court stated: 
Had appellant made a motion for leave to amend her answer, plaintiff would 
have been entitled to at least five days' advance notice of the hearing on that 
motion. Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P. If we were to uphold this manner of injecting 
new issues into a case, summary judgment could always be thwarted by the 
procedure attempted here by the appellant. While we have held that the rules 
must be liberally interpreted to accomplish justice, they should be sufficiently 
adhered to so there is an orderly procedure followed in the resolution of a case. 
Valley Bank & Trust Co., 668 P.2d 493, 494. 
The very argument presented by Smith in this case was presented by the defendant in 
Valley Bank & Trust Co. The argument failed there and the Court should uphold the District 
Court's determination in this matter. 
G5\Lit\Smith\Appeal\Bnef 9 
POINT II 
SMITH'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FAIL ON THE MERITS. 
Even if this Court were to find that Smith's defenses were properly pleaded and 
presented, those defenses fail on the merits, as a matter of law, and summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
It is well settled law that an appellate court may affirm a trial court decision on any 
proper ground, despite the trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). In this case, an 
examination of the affirmative defenses at issue clearly demonstrates that Smith cannot 
succeed on the merits of those defenses. Therefore, the District Court's award of summary 
judgment was appropriate. 
A, Woods Cross City's Zoning of Smith's Property Does Not Create an Illegal Spot 
Zone, 
In his Brief, Smith cites language from Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Assoc, v. 
Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976) in support of his argument relating to spot 
zoning. However, Smith fails to cite the full language explaining the reasoning of the court. 
In addition to the language cited by Smith, the court went on to state: 
It is doubtful that the term "spot zoning" applies to this case in view of the size 
of the tract. In the area surrounding the subject property there are a number of 
commercial enterprises most of which began prior to the adoption of a zoning 
ordinance by the county. 
05\Lit\Smith\Appeal\Bnef 10 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners, 545 P.2d 1150 at 1152 (emphasis added). The same 
rationale would apply in this case. Each of the neighboring properties listed in Smith's Brief 
is zoned 1-1, the same classification as Smith's Property. At least nine of the eleven 
businesses adjacent to Smith's Property are either validly approved or legal nonconforming 
uses. (See Second Affidavit of Tim Stephens, R. at 130.) As noted by the court in 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners, an allegation of "spot zoning" cannot rest upon a disparity 
in use created by neighboring nonconforming uses. 
Finally, it should be noted that if Smith has concerns with the zone classifications 
enacted by the City, those concerns cannot be raised now, more than nine years after 
adoption of the City's Zoning Ordinance. The City's authority to zone Smith's Property 
derives from the Utah State Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah 
Code Ann. Title 10, Chapter 9. Part 10 of the Land Use Development and Management Act 
sets forth procedures relating to appeals and enforcement actions brought under said Act. 
Section 10-9-1001 provides, in part: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land 
use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
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(Emphasis added). Smith's time to challenge the zoning classifications enacted by the City 
has long passed. 
B. Smith's Claim of Discriminatory Zoning Fails as a Matter of Law. 
Smith's claim of discriminatory zoning also fails as a matter of law. Smith's claim 
is based on the uses of other lots within the Newport Subdivision. As noted in the attached 
Second Affidavit of Tim Stephens, at least nine of the eleven uses set forth in paragraph 13 
of Defendant's Brief are either legally nonconforming uses, or properly approved uses under 
the City's current Zoning Ordinance. R. at 130. Therefore, Smith has failed to state a claim 
that the City has enforced its Zoning Ordinance in a discriminatory manner or that the 
regulations are discriminatory in nature and effect. 
C. Defendant's Claim of an Unlawful Taking Without Just Compensation Fails as 
a Matter of Law. 
In his Brief, Smith argues that the City's zoning effects a taking without just 
compensation. However, Smith's arguments on this point are not ripe for consideration and, 
further, they fail as a matter of law, on the merits. 
1. The Takings Claim Is Procedurally Defective. 
Smith's takings claim is not ripe for consideration. As noted above, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1001, infra, provides, in part: 
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative 
remedies. 
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Therefore, as noted in the District Court's Order, Smith has made no application for any land 
use approvals from the City. R. at 139. Smith has failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies and cannot claim to this Court that his Property has been taken. 
2. The Takings Claim Fails as a Matter of Law. 
Even if the Court were to consider this allegation, Smith, as a matter of law, cannot 
prove that the City's zoning regulation effects a taking. A statute regulating the uses that can 
be made of property effects a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use of his land. 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'«. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,494,107 S.Ct. 1232,1246 
(1987); Smith Inv. Co, v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 257, 258 (Utah App. 1998). 
Smith has set forth the ridiculous argument that all economically viable use of his 
Property has been denied. In support of this allegation, Smith has averred: "Affiant sees no 
economical viable uses of said property considering the surrounding uses and the permitted 
uses under the I-l zoning classification." R. at 112. This statement is completely 
unsupported by any foundation. Additionally, Smith fails to demonstrate why the potential 
uses listed as conditional uses in the I-l Zone are not economically viable. 
In Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an affidavit that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated 
conclusions and that fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of fact. 
Additionally, an affidavit based merely on unsubstantiated opinions and belief is insufficient 
to create an issue of fact. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
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Simple common sense dictates that, with a long list of conditional uses within the 1-1 
Zone and the numerous businesses legally operating in the 1-1 Zone, Smith's Property is not 
denied of all economically viable use. Utah law also clearly holds that a mere diminution 
in value is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by regulation. Cornish 
Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991). Smith has made no attempt to determine 
what uses may be allowed and he failed to offer any credible, admissible evidence 
demonstrating that economically viable use of his Property has been destroyed. Therefore, 
his takings claim fails on the merits, as a matter of law. 
D, Smith's Use of the Newport Subdivision Property Cannot be Justified as an 
Accessory Use. 
As noted above, Smith's Property is zoned I-1, Light Industrial. Chapter 12-14 of the 
City's Zoning Ordinance sets forth regulations relating to the Light Industrial Zone. Section 
12-14-104 of that chapter reads: 
Accessory uses in buildings customarily incidental to the permitted uses 
and conditional uses provided herein may be approved by the City in 
accordance with the provisions of this title. 
As noted in this section, an accessory use must be approved as part of the permitted or 
conditional use on the Property. The trial court in this matter found, as undisputed fact, that 
Smith had never received site plan or conditional use approval for his operation of a trucking 
company on the Newport Subdivision Property. Accordingly, Smith's use of that Property 
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cannot be approved as an accessory use. Therefore, his arguments on this point fail as a 
matter of law. 
To the extent Smith's argument can be read to assert that his operations should be 
allowed to expand to the Newport Subdivision Property as part of the valid nonconforming 
use in West Bountiful, it is also incorrect. Section 12-22-104 of the Woods Cross City 
Municipal Code states: 
A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed 
unless the use is changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is 
located, and a nonconforming building shall not be reconstructed or 
structurally altered unless such alteration results in removing those conditions 
of the building which render it nonconforming, except as follows: 
(a) More Desirable. When authorized by the City Council in 
consideration of the prior recommendation of the Planning 
Commission, and in accordance with this Title, a nonconforming use 
which is determined to be of a more desirable nature may be substituted 
for another nonconforming use. 
(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary for 
building safety may be made to a nonconforming building provided that 
the floor area of such building is not increased. 
(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended 
to include the entire floor area of the existing building in which it is 
conducted at the time the use became nonconforming. 
(d) Force Majeure. A nonconforming building or structure 
which is damaged or partially destroyed by fire, flood, wind, 
earthquake, or other calamity or act of nature or the public enemy, may 
be restored. The occupancy or use of such building structure or part 
thereof which existed at the time of such partial destruction may be 
continued or resumed provided that such restoration is started within a 
period of 1 year and is diligently prosecuted to completion within a 
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period of 2 years. In the event such damage or destruction exceeds 3 
times the assessed value of such nonconforming building or structure, 
no repairs or reconstruction shall be made, except in the case of 
residences or accessory farm buildings, unless every portion of such 
building or structure is made to conform to all regulations for new 
buildings in the zone in which it is located, as determined by the 
Planning Director. 
Any extension of Smith's use onto the Newport Subdivision Property would constitute an 
enlargement or extension of the nonconforming use in violation of the City's nonconforming 
use regulations. Accordingly, this argument must be rejected. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS REGARDING LOT 14 WERE 
CORRECT. 
The trial court in this matter determined, as a matter of undisputed fact, that "Lot 14 
of the Property is being used for the parking of personal vehicles and other recreational 
vehicles such as jet skis, trailers and campers." R. at 139. Smith seems to argue that he 
should be allowed to use Lot 14 in his trucking business because: 
[T]he trial court did not seem to consider whether the "personal vehicles" 
stored were being stored on a private basis separate from the trucking company 
or whether they were being stored as part of the trucking business as an 
employee benefit or other trucking business related use. 
Brief of Appellant at p. 14. This argument does nothing to compromise the District Court's 
decision on this point. The particular reason the personal vehicles are being stored on the lot 
(the parking of personal vehicles as opposed to dump trucks or other large industrial-type 
trucks) is irrelevant to the actual use of the lot. The fact is that Lot 14, as determined by the 
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District Court, was not being used for the parking of trucks used in Smith's trucking 
business. That determination of fact was not disputed in any way by Smith and therefore, 
the decision of the District Court was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to discovery requests in this matter, Smith has asserted that his use of the 
Property constitutes no injury to the City because "the image of Woods Cross City is one of 
oil refineries and freeways." R. at 34. In fact, the Woods Cross City Council, as a legislative 
determination and in the interest of protecting public health, safety and welfare, has 
determined those uses which are appropriate in the area where Smith's Property is located. 
Prior to Smith's use of the Property, it was determined that use of the Property for storage 
of trucks and equipment is not appropriate and is therefore detrimental to public health, 
safety and welfare. Smith's blatant disregard of City laws in the face of requests to comply 
was appropriately enjoined by the District Court. For the foregoing reasons, that decision 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this ^Q£f day of August, 2001. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys for PfemtifFW5ods Cross City 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h i s ^ ^ day of August, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, first-
class United States mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE to the following: 
Randy B. Birch 
114 South 200 West 
HeberCity,UT 84032 
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ADDENDUM 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decisions 
made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this chapter until 
that person has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
the exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition 
is tolled from the date a property owner files a request for 
arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the private 
property ombudsman under Section 63-34-13 until 30 days 
after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the private property ombudsman issues a 
written statement under Subsection 63-34-13(4)(b) 
declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only 
as to the specific constitutional taking issues that are the subject 
of the request for arbitration filed with the private property 
ombudsman by a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the private 
property ombudsman after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to 
file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a 
petition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. 
Accessory uses in buildings customarily incidental to the permitted uses 
and conditional uses provided herein may be approved by the City in 
accordance with the provisions of this title. 
Woods Cross City Municipal Code § 12-14-104. 
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A nonconforming use shall not be enlarged, extended, or changed 
unless the use is changed to a use permitted in the district in which it is 
located, and a nonconforming building shall not be reconstructed or 
structurally altered unless such alteration results in removing those conditions 
of the building which render it nonconforming, except as follows: 
(a) More Desirable. When authorized by the City Council in 
consideration of the prior recommendation of the Planning 
Commission, and in accordance with this Title, a nonconforming use 
which is determined to be of a more desirable nature may be substituted 
for another nonconforming use. 
(b) Repairs. Repairs and structural alterations necessary for 
building safety may be made to a nonconforming building provided that 
the floor area of such building is not increased. 
(c) Within Building. A nonconforming use may be extended 
to include the entire floor area of the existing building in which it is 
conducted at the time the use became nonconforming. 
(d) Force Majeure. A nonconforming building or structure 
which is damaged or partially destroyed by fire, flood, wind, 
earthquake, or other calamity or act of nature or the public enemy, may 
be restored. The occupancy or use of such building structure or part 
thereof which existed at the time of such partial destruction may be 
continued or resumed provided that such restoration is started within a 
period of 1 year and is diligently prosecuted to completion within a 
period of 2 years. In the event such damage or destruction exceeds 3 
times the assessed value of such nonconforming building or structure, 
no repairs or reconstruction shall be made, except in the case of 
residences or accessory farm buildings, unless every portion of such 
building or structure is made to conform to all regulations for new 
buildings in the zone in which it is located, as determined by the 
Planning Director. 
Woods Cross City Municipal Code § 12-22-104. 
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